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Abstract—This paper presents HeNet, a hierarchical ensemble
neural network, applied to classify hardware-generated control
flow traces for malware detection. Deep learning-based malware
detection has so far focused on analyzing executable files and
runtime API calls. Static code analysis approaches face challenges
due to obfuscated code and adversarial perturbations. Behavioral
data collected during execution is more difficult to obfuscate
but recent research has shown successful attacks against API
call based malware classifiers. We investigate control flow based
characterization of a program execution to build robust deep
learning malware classifiers.
HeNet consists of a low-level behavior model and a top-
level ensemble model. The low-level model is a per-application
behavior model, trained via transfer learning on a time-series of
images generated from control flow trace of an execution. We
use Intel R© Processor Trace enabled processor for low overhead
execution tracing and design a lightweight image conversion and
segmentation of the control flow trace. The top-level ensemble
model aggregates the behavior classification of all the trace
segments and detects an attack. The use of hardware trace adds
portability to our system and the use of deep learning eliminates
the manual effort of feature engineering.
We evaluate HeNet against real-world exploitations of PDF
readers. HeNet achieves 100% accuracy and 0% false positive on
test set, and higher classification accuracy compared to classical
machine learning algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to recent security threat reports, one million
malware variants hit the internet every day while new malware
samples found in Q3 2017 increased to a record high of 57.6
million [1][2]. Traditional signature-based malware detection
techniques are growing ineffective as the malware authors use
code obfuscation, polymorphism, etc. to automate writing new
malware variants and zero-day exploits to create new malware.
Hence, the security community are pursuing machine learning-
based detection approaches to adapt to the rapidly changing
malware ecosystem. Neural networks able to automatically
learn features have been proven to detect and classify complex
malware with high accuracy. While significant progress in
deep learning makes it promising for automated malware
analysis, further work is needed to build robust and scalable
malware classifiers.
Existing deep learning-based malware detection and clas-
sification systems learn features from static analysis of an
executable file or runtime behavioral analysis. The static analy-
sis approaches build neural networks using header, instruction
opcodes, or raw bytes of an executable file and classify the file
before execution [3][4][5]. The dynamic analysis approaches
model user or kernel API call sequences over time for a
program execution [6][7][8][9][10]. Despite their potential, the
neural network malware classifiers are susceptible to adver-
sarial inputs. By crafting adversarial malware samples [11] or
API call sequences [12][13], an attacker can mislead the mal-
ware classifier and achieve high misclassification rate without
affecting the malware functionality. Generally, it is a lot more
challenging to perturb dynamically gathered features. The API
call-based dynamic features, however, have been shown to
be vulnerable to black-box attacks. The proposed attacks are
effective against many classifiers including recurrent neural
network variants, feed forward deep neural networks, and
traditional machine learning classifiers. To be noted, API call-
based malware analysis requires significant manual feature
engineering to select the API calls most relevant to malware
execution.
We investigate more sophisticated dynamic features to build
a robust deep learning malware classifier. In this paper, we
describe a malware detection system powered by HeNet,
a hierarchical ensemble neural network, that classifies the
control flow trace of program execution. Control flow anal-
ysis has been widely used in security to mitigate memory
corruption attacks by enforcing pre-specified security policies
over a program execution [14]. HeNet, however, is the first
malware detection approach to apply deep learning on fine-
grained control flow traces. We build a per-application deep-
learning behavioral model to distinguish benign and malicious
executions of the application. The key observation underlying
our work is that malware exploits temporarily or persistently
execute malicious code in the context of a victim process and
hence, change the original control flow of the application.
We utilize Intel R© Processor Trace (Intel R© PT), a low
overhead tracing capability in the CPU, to get the complete
control flow audit of a program execution. Intel R© PT records
the non-deterministic control flow transfers, contextual, timing,
etc. information and transmits the data in highly compressed
trace packets. The control flow packets combined with the
program binary can be used to reconstruct the exact sequence
of instructions executed but the post-processing takes a long
time due to the high volume of trace data. We, however,
notice that the control flow packets can be used as an encoded
representation of the control flow transfers over a program
execution. We convert the payload of control flow packets to
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a stream of pixels and represent the control flow as a time
series of images. Utilizing low level trace packets eliminates
manual feature engineering and makes our system portable
across different operating systems and hardware.
We train a deep neural network on the sequence of control
flow images to build an application behavioral model. To
accelerate the training on a large number of images, we use
deep transfer learning [15][16]. Each trace is represented by a
time series of images whose label is classified by the low-level
model. An ensemble model is imposed on top to aggregate the
behavior classifications over the entire trace.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
(1) We develop the first (to the best of our knowledge) deep
learning approach to malware detection using fine-grained
control flow traces of an application execution. We present the
architecture of HeNet, a hierarchical ensemble neural network,
that classifies a control flow trace to detect malware.
(2) We utilize Intel R© PT, a low overhead tracing hardware in
commodity processors, to collect control flow trace. The low
level trace based features make HeNet extensible and portable
to various systems.
(3) We represent the control flow trace as a time series of
images and define behavioral anomaly detection as an image
classification problem. We apply transfer learning to achieve
high accuracy and faster training on large number of trace
images.
(4) We evaluate HeNet against real-world exploitations of
Adobe R© Reader 9.3 on Windows R© 7 32 bit. The experimental
results show 100% accuracy to classify malicious and benign
PDFs and 0% false positive. We show that HeNet produces
much higher classification accuracy and lower false positive
rate compared to classical machine learning algorithms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec. II
discusses the threat model and a brief background on Intel R©
PT. Sec. III presents the design overview of our anti-malware
system. Sec. V presents HeNet architecture in detail. HeNet
performance results are reported in Sec. VI. We discuss the
related work in Sec. VII and conclude in Sec. VIII.
II. BACKGROUND AND THREAT MODEL
A. Threat Model
We intend to detect malware attacks by classifying con-
trol flow transfers over an application execution. Hence, we
consider the attacks that change the execution flow of a
benign application. This threat model covers a wide range of
malware attacks, including control flow attacks such as Return-
Oriented-Programming (ROP), Jump-Oriented-Programming
(JOP) attacks, fileless malware that run under the cover of
benign applications, zero-day attacks.
HeNet learns the control flow model of an application exe-
cution from the sequence of control flow packets produced by
Intel R© PT. Hence, we assume that the Intel R© PT hardware is
trusted so that the generated trace is complete and accurate. We
also assume that the integrity of trace is protected in memory
and while in use for decoding, training, and classification.
B. Intel R© Processor Trace (Intel R© PT)
Intel R© PT is a low overhead debugging hardware that
captures the complete execution trace of monitored applica-
tions. It captures information about application execution on
each hardware thread using dedicated hardware so that the
trace can be post-processed to reconstruct exact program flow.
This capability is particularly useful for baremetal malware
analysis, targeted to track evasive malware that can otherwise
bypass software instrumentation based malware detection.
Intel R© PT captures control flow, timing, and other con-
textual information in highly compressed trace packets. We
utilize the Target IP (TIP) and Taken Not-Taken (TNT) packets
to characterize an application execution. TIP packets record
the target address of indirect branches, exceptions, interrupts.
TNT packets track the direction of conditional branches within
basic blocks. A TNT packet contains a number of conditional
branches, where each bit corresponds to a conditional branch.
If a conditional branch is taken during execution, a bit of value
1 is recorded; 0 otherwise.
III. MALWARE DETECTION SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Figure 1 shows the system overview of malware detection
using HeNet on Intel R© PT trace. We train HeNet, consisting
of a low-level behavior and top-level ensemble model, to
build a benign/malicious classification model of an application
execution. During testing, we apply the HeNet behavior model
to detect anomalous trace/execution segments and its ensemble
model to decide on an attack over the full trace. We configure
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Figure 1. System overview of malware detection using Intel R© PT and HeNet
Intel R© PT to monitor an application at runtime and generate
execution trace. We use both benign and malicious traces of an
application to train HeNet. We refer to an execution trace as
benign when the benign version of an application is executed
and as malicious when the application is exploited to conduct
an attack. Given a raw PT trace, the Trace Decoder decodes
the trace packets and extracts the sequence of TIP and TNT
packets. A data pre-processing component, Image Translator,
converts the TNT and TIP packets to a 1-dimensional array
of pixels. Due to the high volume of trace data, it is compu-
tationally infeasible to build a neural network on the whole
pixel array. Instead, we segment the pixel array into n sub-
arrays and establish a low-level behavior model as a part of
the hierarchical structure of HeNet. Thus, the Image Translator
converts the execution trace to a time series of images. The
HeNet Module performs transfer learning on the sequence of
trace images to learn a benign/malicious behavior model.
At testing, we perform segmentation and image conversion
of a given trace, as similar to training. The HeNet Module
applies the behavior model on each image to classify the exe-
cution behavior in that segment, and uses top-level ensemble
to aggregate the behaviors learned from all the segments. The
aggregated probability is fed into a Malware Detector which
detects an attack if the probability exceeds a threshold.
IV. CONTROL FLOW TO CHARACTERIZE EXECUTION
We utilize the TIP and TNT packets in Intel R© PT trace
to characterize an execution. We design a lightweight image
conversion technique that converts the payload of a TIP/TNT
packet to a stream of pixels. A pixel value is [0, 255].
A. Taken Not-Taken (TNT) packet conversion
There are two variants of TNT packets: (1) Short TNT
packet of 1 byte, (2) Long TNT packet of up to 8 bytes. The
short TNT packet has the least significant bit as 1-bit header
and may contain from 1 to 6 TNT bits. The long TNT packet
has the least significant 2 bytes as 2-byte header and may
contain up to 47 TNT bits. The last valid TNT bit is followed
by a trailing 1, or stop-bit. If the TNT packet is not full, the
stop-bit moves up and the trailing bits are filled with 0’s.
We convert the short TNT packet to an unsigned 1-byte
value representing 1 pixel intensity. For long TNT packets, we
remove the headers and find the length of the packet payload.
We convert each byte of payload to a pixel value. Hence, a
long TNT packet may generate from 1 to 6 pixels.
B. Target IP (TIP) packet conversion
The TIP packet has 1 byte header, where the most significant
3 bits specify how the target address of an indirct branch is
compressed in payload. Due to compression, the size of target
IP payload may vary from 0 to 8 bytes.
We remove the TIP packet header and extract the target IP
payload. Using the IP payload and last saved IP, we reconstruct
the full target address of the indirect branch. We use auxiliary
runtime binary load information to find the binary which the
target address belongs to. We identify each binary with a 1
byte ID. To normalize the impact of ASLR, we calculate the
offset of the target address from the binary base address. We
represent the target address as a <binary ID, offset> pair and
convert the 1 byte ID and 4 byte offset to an array of 5 pixels.
V. HENET: HIERARCHICAL ENSEMBLE NEURAL
NETWORK
In this section, we present the detailed architecture of
HeNet, designed for Intel R© PT trace. HeNet consists of a
low-level deep learning model to classify benign/malicious
behavior of trace segments, and a high-level ensemble model
to aggregate behaviors learned from all the trace segments.
A. Segmentation and Image Conversion
After the pixel conversion of TNT and TIP packets as
described in Section IV, an execution trace is represented as
a one-dimensional pixel array. We denote the pixel array by
X ∈ [0, 255]L, i.e., X has length L and each element is within
0-255. Next, we divide X into n segments, where each trace
segment is of length m2. If L is not a multiple of m2, we pad
the last segment with 0’s.
Each segment is mapped to a two-dimensional m×m array
and represented as a gray-scale image. Thus, X , the pixel
representation of a trace, is transformed to a time series of
images (I1, I2, · · · , In), where each Ik ∈ [0, 255]m×m. Note
that the sequence-to-image transformation only resizes the data
shape and no information is lost from resizing.
B. Low-Level Behavior Model
The low-level model in HeNet is a Deep Neural Network
(DNN) to classify the behavior of a trace segment as benign
or malicious. As we use the image representeation of a
trace segment, we apply deep learning to extract the textural
features of the trace images. Visual similarities among the
benign trace segment images and among the malicious trace
segment images motivate us to frame the problem as an image
classification problem.
1) Training Dataset: The time series of trace images are
the training dataset for the low-level DNN model. We utilize
the original label of the Intel R© PT trace to label the sequence
of images. Noisy ground truth, however, imposes a challenge
here. In supervised learning, the labels of training data are
assumed to be absolutely correct. Our ground truth is noisy,
since a malicious trace may contain benign execution until
the attack happens. Hence, if a trace Xi is malicious, we first
identify the time of attack k and then label (Iik, I
i
k+1, · · · , Iin)
as malicious. For a benign trace Xi, all the segmented images
(Ii1, I
i
2, · · · , Iin) are labeled as benign.
2) Training via Transfer Learning: Intel R© PT generates a
large volume of data and segmentation makes the low-level
sample size even larger. Hence, training a neural network from
scratch may not be the optimal solution. We perform transfer
learning [15] to train the behavior model. We transfer the
knowledge learned from the state-of-the-art DNNs on large
image sets and retrain the layers suitable for our classification.
Currently, HeNet framework supports transfer learning us-
ing a variety of networks including Inception [17][18][19]
and VGG [20] networks, pre-trained on ImageNet datasets.
The resizing parameter m is set to an appropriate value. The
channels of gray-scale images are augmented by replicating
the gray channel into RGB channels. Our empirical analysis
shows that the choice of a particular transfer learning network
does not make significant difference in classification perfor-
mance. HeNet, however, shows higher accuracy and lower
false positive rates compared to classical machine learning
algorithms and neural networks trained from scratch. Transfer
learning also helps HeNet achieve faster model convergence
(within 10 epochs in our experiments).
C. Top-level Ensemble Model
Given an execution trace, represented as image sequence
(I1, I2, ..., In), the low-level model produces corresponding
behavioral probabilities (p1, p2, ..., pn). The ensemble model
aggregates the probabilities by computing the average, p =
1
n
∑n
i=1 pi. We compare p with a pre-specified threshold to
decide whether the execution corresponds to an attack or not.
HeNet is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 HeNet on Intel R© PT
1: Goal: Malware detection.
2: Input: Intel R© PT trace, resizing parameter m.
3: Step 1 Convert TNT and TIP packets to pixels of value
[0, 255]. Denote pixel array by X .
4: Step 2 Slice X into n segments, where n = Lm2 . L is the
length of X and a segment is of length m2.
5: Step 3 Convert each segment to an image of m × m.
Denote an image by Ik with k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
6: Step 4 Apply low-level deep learning behavior model on
Ik and obtain probability of each segment as pk.
7: Step 5 Predict the label of X by averaging (p1, ..., pn).
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the performance results of
HeNet in detecting real-world attacks. We evaluate HeNet
with respect to malware detection accuracy and false positive
rate. We compare the performance of HeNet low-level model
with a neural network trained from scratch and three classical
machine learning algorithms.
A. Experimental Setup
To show the effectiveness of our malware detection system,
we use ROP attacks against Adobe R© Reader 9.3 in Windows R©
7 32 bit. In our experiments, we use a set of 348 benign and
299 malicious PDF samples. We utilize Intel R© VTuneTM Am-
plifier driver to collect Intel R© PT trace and develop a decoder
to extract TNT and TIP packets. Out of total 647 traces, 53 are
set aside for out-of-sample testing. From the remaining traces,
we choose train-validation-test ratio as 0.8 : 0.1 : 0.1. We set
the resizing parameter m to 224 and the gray-scale images
are of size 224 × 224. Thus, the training and validation sets
contain 419075 benign and 276110 malicious trace images and
the test set have 48886 benign and 29028 malicious images.
B. Experimental Results
1) Low-level behavior model performance: To train the
low-level model, we utilize Inception-BN at iteration 126 as
the pre-trained model for transfer learning with learning rate at
0.05 and batch size at 100. We retrain the last fully connected
layer and the softmax layer on trace segment images. Figure 2a
shows the ROC curve of the low-level behavior model. The
area under the curve is 0.989. Figure 2b shows that the
(a) ROC of behavior model. The
area under curve is 0.989
(b) Plot of confusion matrix. Accuracy is
0.981 and false positive rate is 0.0073.
Figure 2. Performance of low-level behvaior model
Table I
COMPARISON OF HENET WITH OTHER CLASSIFIERS
Behavior model Accuracy FPR Resolution
HeNet low-level model 0.98 0.0073 224×224×3
Low-resolution model 0.90 0.1 28×28×1
3-nearest neighbor + PCA 0.80 0.05 2242 → 1000
Random forest + PCA 0.63 0.02 2242 → 1000
3-nearest neighbor 0.75 0.4 282
Naive Bayes 0.82 0.23 282
behavior model achieves 0.981 accuracy and 0.0073 false
positive rate on the test set. Thus, HeNet achieves low false
positive rate without sacrificing accuracy. Utilizing transfer
learning, the training converges within 10 epochs.
Next, we examine the features extracted from the low-level
behavior model using transfer learning. We randomly select
22% of benign and 55% of malicious behavior images from
test set, feed them to the trained low-level model, and com-
pute the global average pooling. Then we apply t-distributed
stochastic neighbor embedding (t-SNE) [21] on the global
average pooling and obtain the first three dimensions. Figure 3
shows the correlation plot (top), t-SNE scatter plots (lower-
triangular), t-SNE density plots (diagonal), correlation (upper
triangular), and label box-plots (upper triangular). As we
see, the first three t-SNE dimensions are well separated. The
correlation among the malicious trace images and correlation
among the benign trace images are positive. The correlation
among the malicious and benign trace images is negative.
We present the performance of the low-level model when
trained via Inception transfer learning vs. trained from scratch.
We note that training a neural network from scratch takes
significantly long time. Hence, we resize the trace images to
low-resolution images of size 28×28 with gray-scale channel
and select LeNet [22] to train from scratch. Since LeNet
architecture is much shallower, training per epoch does not
take too long, yet the model converges much slower.
We also compare the performance of HeNet with classical
machine learning algorithms including random forest, naive
Bayes, and k-nearest neighbor on high and low resolution
vectorized images. For this comparison, we sub-sample 17% of
the training data for 5 times and compute the average accuracy
and false positive. For 224× 224 images, we apply principal
component analysis to reduce dimension from 50176 to 1000.
Table I presents the comparative analysis of HeNet low-
level model, LeNet low-resolution model, nearest neighbor,
and random forest on both high and low resolution images.
Figure 3. Visualization of the features learned from HeNet low-level model.
Among all the algorithms, the HeNet low-level model achieves
the highest behavior classification accuracy and lowest false
positive rate. The low-resolution model is trained on 28× 28
grey-scale images, resized from the 224 × 224 images. The
performance degradation of the low-resolution model may be
due to much shallower architecture compared to Inception-
v1, fewer image channels, or information loss from image
resizing. The low-resolution model, however, may provide a
performance baseline for the deep learning image classifiers.
We further investigate the low-resolution model with deeper
architecture on three-channel images in Sec VIII. We expect
the machine learning algorithms will have performance im-
provement if more domain expertise is leveraged for feature
extraction. On the other hand, it highlights the advantage of
deep learning in greatly saving the cost of feature engineering.
2) Top-level ensemble model performance: The ensemble
model aggregates the low level execution behaviors by com-
puting an average of the behavior probabilities. To determine
whether an execution trace is benign or malicious, we set a
threshold of 0.5. On our test set, we obtain 100% detection
accuracy and 0 false positive rate.
The ensemble probabilities of being benign for the 31
benign test traces have a mean of 0.98 and a minimum of
0.96. The p-value of a two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test
on the ensemble probabilities of being benign for the 31
benign traces and 22 malicious traces is 4.3×10−15, indicating
Figure 4. Density of the ensemble benign probabilities. HeNet produces high
confidence predictions.
statistically distinguishable prediction scores. Figure 4 shows
the density of ensemble benign probability across benign and
malicious test cases. Thus, HeNet achieves high confidence
classification at both low-level behavior model and top-level
ensemble model.
C. Time Series of Behavior Probabilities
The aggregated probability produced by the ensemble model
enables malware detection with high confidence. For the traces
with high ensemble probability, the time series of behavioral
probabilities are relatively smooth. Refer to Figure 5a as an
example. We, however, examine a malicious test trace which
has a 0.62 probability of being malicious. Here, the decision
confidence is lower compared to other test cases. Figure 5b
shows the execution time-series and reveals that the behaviors
towards 20% from the tail were classified as benign. From
manual analysis, we find that the attack invokes a lot of
strcmp() function calls in a loop. Since strcmp() is a com-
monly used function, the malicious execution segments are
misclassified as benign causing a lower detection confidence.
(a) An example of smooth probabilities. The trace is
malicious and the probabilities of being benign are mostly
0.
(b) A malicious trace with anomalous behavior. We
discover that towards the tail of execution, a system
function is called in a loop, causing the low-level model
to misclassify the time period as benign.
Figure 5. Time series behavior probabilities.
VII. RELATED WORK
There has been little work so far in developing robust
deep learning malware classifiers. Existing deep learning ap-
proaches use static or dynamic features to construct neural
networks for malware detection or classification. The static
features are obtained by analyzing an executable file. Neural
network malware classifiers have been trained on static fea-
tures including byte/entropy histogram, imports, raw header
bytes and other metadata of Portable Executable files or
several million byte long executable files [7][5][3]. Despite this
success, Grosse et al. showed that such malware detectors can
be bypassed by adversarially crafted malware samples [11].
Dynamic analysis approaches are more robust to obfus-
cation. Dahl et al. proposed a multi-class malware neural
network classifier trained on random projections of features in-
cluding API call tri-grams, API parameter, and file strings [6].
Pascanu et al. trained recurrent neural nets on API call
information for both malware detection and classification [23].
Kolosnjaji et al. combine convolutional and recurrent neural
networks to optimize malware classification [10]. API call
based approaches require significant domain knowledge and
feature engineering. More importantly, an attacker can effec-
tively bypass sequential API feature based malware detectors
by generating sequential adversarial examples [12][13].
Classical machine learning algorithms have been applied on
static binaries, converted to images, for multi-family malware
classification [24][25].
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
HeNet is the first deep learning approach to classify Intel R©
PT generated fine-grained control flow traces for malware
detection. HeNet is portable across various software systems
due to using hardware execution trace based features. HeNet
achieves high accuracy and faster training as it builds applica-
tion behavior model by using transfer learning on a time-series
of images, generated from control flow trace. The experimental
results show that HeNet detects ROP attacks agianst Adobe R©
Reader with 100% accuracy and 0% false positive.
This work is a step towards deep learning analysis of
application execution trace for robust malware detection. We
discuss below our future work in this direction.
A. Ensemble Behavior Model
To achieve high accuracy and faster training, the HeNet
low-level behavior model is trained via transfer learning
on high resolution trace images. We refer to the model as
high-resolution model. We investigate an ensemble of high-
resolution model and low-resolution model, a model trained
from scratch on low resolution images, for further performance
improvement. We train ResNet from scratch with 20 layers
for three-channel images of size 28×28, learning rate of
0.05, and batch size of 100. We choose the model at 20th
epoch. Note that HeNet’s behavior model converges within 10
epochs. We apply convex combination on the low-resolution
and high-resolution model so that the new model is Me =
αMl + (1 − α)Mh, where α ∈ [0, 1] is selected to optimize
Figure 6. Accuracy and FPR for various convex combination parameter α.
Optimal accuracy and FPR of HeNet and low-res model is at α = 0 and
α = 1, respectively.
Table II
PERFORMANCE OF ENSEMBLE BEHAVIOR MODEL
Behavior model Accuracy FPR Resolution
Ensemble low-level model Me 0.983 0.0029 High-low res
HeNet low-level model Mh 0.981 0.0073 224×224×3
ResNet Low-resolution model Ml 0.976 0.0022 28×28×3
metrics including accuracy, false positive rate, sensitivity, and
area under the curve [26]. In Figure 6, we consider an optimal
convex combination parameter α ∈ [0.48, 0.68] for both
desired accuracy and FPR. Selecting α = 0.5, model Me has
0.9831 accuracy, higher than that of Ml and 0.0029 FPR, lower
than that of Mh. We plan to further investigate this model.
B. Adversarial Machine Learning
Studies show that small adversarial purturbations, even un-
noticable by human eyes, may lead to misclassification by deep
learning image classifiers [27][28][29]. As we assume end-to-
end trace security, to fool the HeNet behavior classification,
the attacker goal is to inject malicious control flow transfers at
runtime in a way that also keeps the application operational.
Determinstic control flow integrity methods are shown to be
vulnerable due to the weakness of control flow graph and
security policies [30][31]. HeNet learns the legitimate control
flow behavior of an application from training on dynamic
traces. As we use both conditional and indirect branches,
the behavior model is fine-grained. Hence, it becomes a
difficult challenge for the attacker to effectively manipulate the
control flow. We, however, will investigate whether an attacker
can bypass the HeNet ensemble model exploiting threshold
based decision. We will also study adversarial perturbations
to exploit HeNet under certain constraints.
C. Different Data Representations
Beyond pixel conversion, TNT/TIP packets may be utilized
to extract other useful features. We plan to investigate indi-
rect branch target addresses to build adversary resilient deep
learning malware classifier.
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